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XMSS: Extended Hash-Based SignaturesTU EindhovenP.O. Box 513Eindhoven5600 MBNLietf@huelsing.netTU DarmstadtHochschulstrasse 10Darmstadt64289DEdbutin@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.degenua GmbHDomagkstrasse 7Kirchheim bei Muenchen85551DEietf@gazdag.deSUNY Buffalo323 Davis HallBuffaloNY14260US+1 716 645-1592 mohaisen@buffalo.edu
IRTF
Crypto Forum Research Group
This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a hash-based
digital signature system. It follows existing descriptions in scientific
literature. The note specifies the WOTS+ one-time signature scheme, a
single-tree (XMSS) and a multi-tree variant (XMSS^MT) of XMSS. Both variants
use WOTS+ as a main building block. XMSS provides cryptographic digital
signatures without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems.
Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic
hash functions. XMSS provides strong security guarantees and is even secure
when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is broken. It is
suitable for compact implementations, relatively simple to implement, and
naturally resists side-channel attacks. Unlike most other signature systems,
hash-based signatures can withstand attacks using quantum computers.
A (cryptographic) digital signature scheme provides asymmetric message authentication. The key
generation algorithm produces a key pair consisting of a private and a public key. A message is
signed using a private key to produce a signature. A message/signature
pair can be verified using a public key. A One-Time Signature (OTS) scheme allows using a
key pair to sign exactly one message securely. A Many-Time Signature (MTS)
system can be used to sign multiple messages.
OTS schemes, and MTS schemes
composed from them, were proposed by Merkle in 1979 .
They were well-studied in the 1990s and have regained interest from the mid 2000s onwards because of their
resistance against quantum-computer-aided attacks. These kinds of signature schemes are called
hash-based signature schemes as they are built out of a cryptographic hash function.
Hash-based signature schemes generally feature small
private and public keys as well as fast signature generation and verification
but large signatures and relatively slow key generation. In addition, they are suitable for compact
implementations that benefit various applications and are naturally resistant to most kinds of side-channel attacks.
Some progress has already been made toward introducing and standardizing
hash-based signatures. McGrew, Curcio, and Fluhrer have published an Internet-Draft
specifying the Lamport-Diffie-Winternitz-Merkle
(LDWM) scheme, also taking into account subsequent adaptations by Leighton and Micali.
Independently, Buchmann, Dahmen and
Huelsing have proposed XMSS , the eXtended Merkle Signature
Scheme, offering better efficiency and a modern security proof. Very recently,
the stateless hash-based signature scheme SPHINCS was introduced ,
with the intent of being easier to deploy in current applications. A reasonable next step
toward introducing hash-based signatures is to complete the specifications of the basic
algorithms - LDWM, XMSS, SPHINCS and/or variants .
The eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) is the latest
stateful hash-based signature scheme. It has the smallest signatures out of such schemes and comes
with a multi-tree variant that solves the problem of slow key generation. Moreover,
it can be shown that XMSS is secure, making only mild assumptions on the underlying hash function. Especially,
it is not required that the cryptographic hash function is collision-resistant for the security of XMSS.
Improvements upon XMSS, as described in , are part of this note.
This document describes a single-tree and a multi-tree variant of XMSS.
It also describes WOTS+, a variant of the Winternitz OTS scheme
introduced in that is used by XMSS. The schemes are described with
enough specificity to ensure interoperability between implementations.
This document is structured as follows. Notation is introduced in
. describes
the WOTS+ signature system. MTS schemes are defined in : the eXtended Merkle
Signature Scheme (XMSS) in , and its Multi-Tree
variant (XMSS^MT) in . Parameter sets are
described in .
describes the rationale behind choices in this note.
The IANA registry for these signature systems is described in
. Finally, security considerations are presented in
.
All post-quantum algorithms documented by CFRG are today
considered ready for experimentation and further engineering
development (e.g. to establish the impact of performance and sizes
on IETF protocols). However, at the time of writing, we do not have
significant deployment experience with such algorithms.
Many of these algorithms come with specific restrictions, e.g.
change of classical interface or less cryptanalysis of proposed
parameters than established schemes. CFRG has consensus that all
documents describing post-quantum technologies include the above
paragraph and a clear additional warning about any specific restrictions,
especially as those might affect use or deployment of the specific scheme.
That guidance may be changed over time via document updates.
Additionally, for XMSS:
CFRG consensus is that we are confident in the cryptographic security
of the signature schemes described in this document against
quantum computers, given the current state of the research
community's knowledge about quantum algorithms. Indeed, we are
confident that the security of a significant part of the Internet
could be made dependent on the signature schemes defined in this
document, if developers take care of the following.
In contrast to traditional signature schemes, the signature schemes
described in this document are stateful, meaning the secret key
changes over time. If a secret key state is used twice, no cryptographic
security guarantees remain. This is a new property that most
developers will not be familiar with and requires careful handling of
secret keys. Developers should not use the schemes described here
except in systems that prevent the reuse of secret key states.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
in .
Bytes and byte strings are the fundamental data types. A byte
is a sequence of eight bits. A single byte is denoted as a
pair of hexadecimal digits with a leading "0x". A byte string is an
ordered sequence of zero or more bytes and is denoted as an ordered
sequence of hexadecimal characters with a leading "0x". For example,
0xe534f0 is a byte string of length 3. An array of byte strings is an
ordered, indexed set starting with index 0 in which all byte strings
have identical length. We assume big-endian representation for any
data types or structures.
If x is a non-negative real number, then we define the following functions:
ceil(x) : returns the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.floor(x) : returns the largest integer less than or equal to x.lg(x) : returns the logarithm to base 2 of x.
When a and b are integers, mathematical operators are defined as follows:
^ : a ^ b denotes the result of a raised to the power of b.* : a * b denotes the product of a and b. This operator is
sometimes omitted in the absence of ambiguity, as in
usual mathematical notation./ : a / b denotes the quotient of a by non-zero b.% : a % b denotes the non-negative remainder of the integer division of a
by b.+ : a + b denotes the sum of a and b.- : a - b denotes the difference of a and b.++ : a++ denotes incrementing a by 1, i.e., a = a + 1.-- : a-- denotes decrementing a by 1, i.e., a = a - 1.<< : a << b denotes a logical left shift with b being non-negative, i.e., a * 2^b.>> : a >> b denotes a logical right shift with b being non-negative, i.e. floor(a / 2^b).
The standard order of operations is used when evaluating arithmetic expressions.
Arrays are used in the common way, where the i^th element of an array A is
denoted A[i]. Byte strings are treated as arrays of bytes where necessary:
If X is a byte string, then X[i] denotes its i^th byte, where X[0] is the
leftmost byte.
If A and B are byte strings of equal length, then:
A AND B denotes the bitwise logical conjunction operation.A XOR B denotes the bitwise logical exclusive disjunction operation.
When B is a byte and i is an integer, then B >> i denotes the logical
right-shift operation.
Similarly, B << i denotes the logical left-shift operation.
If X is an x-byte string and Y a y-byte string, then X || Y denotes the
concatenation of X and Y, with X || Y = X[0] ... X[x-1] Y[0] ... Y[y-1].
If x and y are non-negative integers, we define Z = toByte(x, y) to be the y-byte
string containing the binary representation of x in big-endian byte-order.
The schemes described in this document randomize each hash function call. This
means that aside from the initial message digest, for each hash function call
a different key and different bitmask is used. These values are pseudorandomly
generated using a pseudorandom function that takes a key SEED and a 32-byte
address ADRS as input and outputs an n-byte value, where n is the security
parameter. Here we explain the structure of
address ADRS and propose setter methods to manipulate the address.
We explain the generation of the addresses in the following
sections where they are used.
The schemes in the next two sections use two kinds of hash functions
parameterized by security parameter n. For the hash tree constructions, a hash
function that maps an n-byte key and 2n-byte inputs to n-byte outputs is used.
To randomize this function, 3n bytes are needed - n bytes for the key and 2n
bytes for a bitmask. For the OTS scheme constructions, a hash
function that maps n-byte keys and n-byte inputs to n-byte outputs is used. To
randomize this function, 2n bytes are needed - n bytes for the key and n bytes
for a bitmask. Consequently, three addresses are needed for the first function
and two addresses for the second one.
There are three different types of addresses for the different use cases. One
type is used for the hashes in OTS schemes, one is used for hashes
within the main Merkle tree construction, and one is used for hashes in the
L-trees. The latter is used to compress one-time public keys. All these
types share as much format as possible. In the following we describe these
types in detail.
The structure of an address complies with word
borders, with a word being 32 bits long in this context. Only the tree address
is too long to fit a single word but matches a double word. An address is
structured as follows. It always starts with a layer address of one word in the
most significant bits, followed by a tree address of two words. Both addresses
are needed for the multi-tree variant (see ) and
describe the position of a tree within a multi-tree. They are therefore set to
zero in case of single-tree applications. For multi-tree hash-based signatures
the layer address describes the height of a tree within the multi-tree starting
from height zero for trees at the bottom layer. The tree address describes the
position of a tree within a layer of a multi-tree starting with index zero for
the leftmost tree. The next word defines the type of the address. It is set to 0
for an OTS address, to 1 for an L-tree address, and to 2 for a hash tree address.
Whenever the type word of an address is changed, all following words should be
initialized with 0 to prevent non-zero values in unused padding words.
We first describe the OTS address case. In this case, the type word is followed
by an OTS address word that encodes the index of the
OTS key pair within the tree. The next word encodes the chain address
followed by a word that encodes the address of the hash function call within
the chain. The last word, called keyAndMask, is used to generate two different
addresses for one hash function call. The
word is set to zero to generate the key. To generate the n-byte bitmask, the word is set to one.
We now discuss the L-tree case, which means that the type word is set to one. In
that case the type word is followed by an L-tree address word that
encodes the index of the leaf computed with this L-tree. The next word
encodes the height of the node inside the L-tree and the following word
encodes the index of the node at that height, inside the L-tree. This time, the last
word, keyAndMask, is used to generate three different addresses for one function call.
The word is set to zero to generate the key. To generate the most significant
n bytes of the 2n-byte bitmask, the word is set to one. The
least significant bytes are generated using the address with the word set
to two.
We now describe the remaining type for the main tree hash addresses. In this
case the type word is set to two, followed by a zero padding of one word. The
next word encodes the height of the tree node being input for the next computation,
followed by a word that encodes the index of this node at that height. As for
the L-tree addresses, the last word, keyAndMask, is used to generate three
different addresses for one function call. The word is set to zero to generate
the key. To generate the most significant n bytes of the 2n-byte bitmask, the
word is set to one. The least significant bytes are generated using the address
with the word set to two.
All fields within these addresses encode unsigned integers. When describing
the generation of addresses we use setter methods that take positive integers
and set the bits of a field to the binary representation of that integer of the
length of the field. We furthermore assume that the setType() method sets the
four words following the type word to zero.
A byte string can be considered as a string of base w numbers, i.e. integers
in the set {0, ... , w - 1}. The correspondence is defined by the function
base_w(X, w, out_len) as follows. If X is a len_X-byte string, and w is a member
of the set {4, 16}, then base_w(X, w, out_len) outputs an array of out_len
integers between 0 and w - 1. The length out_len is REQUIRED to be less than or
equal to 8 * len_X / lg(w).
To simplify algorithm descriptions, we assume the existence of member functions.
If a complex data structure like a public key PK contains a value X then
getX(PK) returns the value of X for this public key. Accordingly, setX(PK, X, Y)
sets value X in PK to the value held by Y. Since camelCase is used for member
function names, a value z may be referred to as Z in the function name, e.g.
getZ.
This section describes the WOTS+ OTS system, in a version similar to
. WOTS+ is a OTS scheme; while a private key can be
used to sign any message, each private key MUST be used only once to sign a single message. In particular, if a
private key is used to sign two different messages, the scheme becomes insecure.
The section starts with an explanation of parameters. Afterwards, the so-called chaining function,
which forms the main building block of the WOTS+ scheme, is explained. A description of the algorithms for
key generation, signing and verification follows. Finally, pseudorandom key generation is discussed.
WOTS+ uses the parameters n, and w; they all take
positive integer values. These parameters are summarized as follows:
n : the message length as well as the length of a private key, public key, or signature element in bytes.w : the Winternitz parameter; it is a member of the set {4, 16}.
The parameters are used to compute values len, len_1 and len_2:
len : the number of n-byte string elements in a WOTS+
private key, public key, and signature. It is computed as len = len_1 + len_2,
with len_1 = ceil(8n / lg(w)) and len_2 = floor(lg(len_1 * (w - 1)) / lg(w)) + 1.
The value of n is determined by the cryptographic hash function used
for WOTS+. The hash function is chosen to ensure an appropriate level of
security. The value of n is the input length that can be processed by the signing algorithm.
It is often the length of a message digest. The parameter w can be chosen from the set {4, 16}. A larger
value of w results in shorter signatures but slower overall signing operations; it has little
effect on security. Choices of w are limited to the values 4 and 16 since
these values yield optimal trade-offs and easy implementation.
WOTS+ parameters are implicitly included in algorithm inputs as needed.
The WOTS+ algorithm uses a keyed cryptographic hash function F.
F accepts and returns byte strings of length n using keys of length n.
More detail on specific instantiations can be found in .
Security requirements on F are discussed in .
In addition, WOTS+ uses a pseudorandom function PRF. PRF takes as input an
n-byte key and a 32-byte index and generates pseudorandom outputs of length n.
More detail on specific instantiations can be found in .
Security requirements on PRF are discussed in .
The chaining function (Algorithm 2) computes an iteration of F on an n-byte input
using outputs of PRF. It takes an OTS hash address as input.
This address will have the first six 32-bit words set to encode the address of this chain.
In each iteration, PRF is used to generate a key for F and a bitmask that is XORed to the intermediate result before it is
processed by F. In the following, ADRS is a 32-byte OTS hash address as specified in and SEED is an n-byte string. To
generate the keys and bitmasks, PRF is called with SEED as key and ADRS as input.
The chaining function takes
as input an n-byte string X, a start index i, a number of steps s, as well as ADRS and SEED.
The chaining function returns as output the value obtained by iterating F for s times on
input X, using the outputs of PRF.
The private key in WOTS+, denoted by sk (s for secret), is a length len array of n-byte strings. This
private key MUST be only used to sign at most one message. Each n-byte string MUST either
be selected randomly from the uniform distribution or using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom procedure.
In the latter case, the security of the used procedure MUST at least match that of the WOTS+ parameters used.
For a further discussion on pseudorandom key generation, see .
The following pseudocode (Algorithm 3) describes an algorithm for generating sk.
A WOTS+ key pair defines a virtual structure that consists
of len hash chains of length w. The len n-byte strings in the private
key each define the start node for one hash chain. The public
key consists of the end nodes of these hash chains. Therefore, like
the private key, the public key is also a length len array of n-byte
strings. To compute the hash chain, the chaining function (Algorithm 2)
is used. An OTS hash address ADRS and a seed SEED have to be provided by the calling algorithm.
This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure.
Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm MUST NOT manipulate any other parts of ADRS
than the last three 32-bit words.
Please note that the SEED used here is public information also available to a verifier.
The following pseudocode (Algorithm 4) describes an algorithm for generating
the public key pk, where sk is the private key.
A WOTS+ signature is a length len array of n-byte strings. The WOTS+
signature is generated by mapping a message to len integers between 0 and
w - 1. To this end, the message is transformed into len_1 base w numbers using the base_w function defined in .
Next, a checksum is computed and appended to the transformed message as len_2 base w numbers using the base_w function.
Note that the checksum may reach a maximum value of len_1 * (w - 1) * 2^8 and
therefore depends on the parameters n and w. For the parameter sets given
in a 32-bit unsigned integer is sufficient. If other
parameter settings are used the size of the variable MUST be sufficiently large.
Each of the base w integers is used to select a node from a different hash chain. The
signature is formed by concatenating the selected nodes.
An OTS hash address ADRS and a seed SEED have to be provided by the calling algorithm.
This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure.
Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm MUST NOT manipulate any other parts of ADRS
than the last three 32-bit words.
Please note that the SEED used here is public information also available to a verifier.
The pseudocode for signature generation is shown below (Algorithm 5), where M is the message and sig
is the resulting signature.
The data format for a signature is given below.
In order to verify a signature sig on a message M, the verifier computes a WOTS+ public key value from the signature.
This can be done by "completing" the chain computations starting from the signature values,
using the base w values of the message hash and its checksum. This step, called WOTS_pkFromSig, is described below
in Algorithm 6. The result of WOTS_pkFromSig is then compared to the given public key. If the values are equal, the signature is accepted.
Otherwise, the signature MUST be rejected.
An OTS hash address ADRS and a seed SEED have to be provided by the calling algorithm.
This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure.
Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm MUST NOT manipulate any other parts of ADRS
than the last three 32-bit words.
Please note that the SEED used here is public information also available to a verifier.
Note: XMSS uses WOTS_pkFromSig to compute a public key value and delays the comparison to a later point.
An implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to
generate the private key from a single n-byte value. For example, the method
suggested in and explained below MAY be used. Other methods MAY be used. The choice of a
pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the
cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used WOTS+ parameters.
The advantage of generating the private key elements from a random n-byte string is
that only this n-byte string needs to be stored instead of the full private key. The key
can be regenerated when needed. The suggested method from
can be described using PRF. During key generation a uniformly random n-byte string S is sampled
from a secure source of randomness. This string S is stored as private key. The private key elements
are computed as sk[i] = PRF(S, toByte(i, 32)) whenever needed. Please note that this seed S MUST be different
from the seed SEED used to randomize the hash function calls. Also, this seed S MUST be kept secret.
In this section, the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme
(XMSS) is described using WOTS+. XMSS comes in two flavors: First, a single-tree
variant (XMSS) and second a multi-tree variant (XMSS^MT). Both allow
combining a large number of WOTS+ key pairs under a single small public
key. The main ingredient added is a binary hash tree construction.
XMSS uses a single hash tree while XMSS^MT uses a tree of XMSS
key pairs.
XMSS is a method for signing a potentially large but fixed number of
messages. It is based on the Merkle signature scheme. XMSS uses four
cryptographic components: WOTS+ as OTS method, two additional
cryptographic hash functions H and H_msg, and a pseudorandom function
PRF. One of the main advantages of XMSS with WOTS+ is that it does
not rely on the collision resistance of the used hash functions but on
weaker properties. Each XMSS public/private key pair is associated
with a perfect binary tree, every node of which contains an n-byte
value. Each tree leaf contains a special tree hash of a WOTS+ public
key value. Each non-leaf tree node is computed by first concatenating
the values of its child nodes, computing the XOR with a bitmask, and
applying the keyed hash function H to the result. The bitmasks and the keys
for the hash function H are generated from a (public) seed that is part of the
public key using the pseudorandom function PRF. The value corresponding to
the root of the XMSS tree forms the XMSS public key together with the seed.
To generate a key pair that can be used to sign 2^h messages, a tree of
height h is used. XMSS is a stateful signature scheme, meaning that
the private key changes with every signature generation. To prevent one-time
private keys from being used twice, the WOTS+ key pairs are numbered
from 0 to (2^h) - 1 according to the related leaf, starting from index 0
for the leftmost leaf. The private key contains an index that is
updated with every signature generation, such that it contains the index of the
next unused WOTS+ key pair.
A signature consists of the index of the used WOTS+ key pair, the WOTS+
signature on the message and the so-called authentication path. The
latter is a vector of tree nodes that allow a verifier to compute a
value for the root of the tree starting from a WOTS+ signature. A verifier computes the root value and
compares it to the respective value in the XMSS public key. If they
match, the signature is declared valid. The XMSS private key consists of all
WOTS+ private keys and the current index. To reduce storage, a
pseudorandom key generation procedure, as described in
, MAY be used. The security of the used method
MUST at least match the security of the XMSS instance.
XMSS has the following parameters:
h : the height (number of levels - 1) of the tree
n : the length in bytes of the message digest as well as of each node
w : the Winternitz parameter as defined for WOTS+ in
There are 2^h leaves in the tree.
For XMSS and XMSS^MT, private and public keys are denoted by SK (S for secret) and PK.
For WOTS+, private and public keys are denoted by sk (s for secret) and pk,
respectively. XMSS and XMSS^MT signatures are denoted by Sig. WOTS+
signatures are denoted by sig.
XMSS and XMSS^MT parameters are implicitly included in algorithm inputs as needed.
Besides the cryptographic hash function F and the pseudorandom function PRF required by WOTS+, XMSS
uses two more functions:
A cryptographic hash function H. H accepts n-byte keys and byte strings of length
2n and returns an n-byte string.A cryptographic hash function H_msg. H_msg accepts 3n-byte keys and byte strings of arbitrary
length and returns an n-byte string.
More detail on specific instantiations can be found in .
Security requirements on H and H_msg are discussed in .
An XMSS private key SK contains 2^h WOTS+ private keys, the leaf index idx
of the next WOTS+ private key that has not yet
been used, SK_PRF, an n-byte key to generate pseudorandom values for randomized message hashing,
the n-byte value root, which is the root node of the tree and SEED, the n-byte public seed used to pseudorandomly generate
bitmasks and hash function keys. Although root and SEED formally would be considered only part of the public key,
they are needed e.g. for signature generation and hence are also required for functions that do not
take the public key as input.
The leaf index idx is initialized to zero when the XMSS private key is created. The key SK_PRF
MUST be sampled from a secure source of randomness that follows the uniform distribution.
The WOTS+ private keys MUST either be generated as described in or, to reduce
the private key size, a cryptographic pseudorandom method MUST be used as discussed in .
SEED is generated as a uniformly random n-byte string. Although SEED is public, it is critical for
security that it is
generated using a good entropy source. The root node is generated as
described below in the section on key generation ().
That section also contains an example algorithm for combined private and public key generation.
For the following algorithm descriptions, the existence of a method getWOTS_SK(SK, i) is assumed.
This method takes as inputs an XMSS private key SK and an integer i and outputs the i^th WOTS+ private
key of SK.
To improve readability we introduce a function RAND_HASH(LEFT, RIGHT, SEED, ADRS) that does the randomized hashing in the tree.
It takes as input two n-byte values LEFT and RIGHT that represent the left and the right half
of the hash function input, the seed SEED used as key for PRF and the address ADRS of this hash function call.
RAND_HASH first uses PRF with SEED and ADRS to generate a key KEY and n-byte bitmasks BM_0, BM_1.
Then it returns the randomized hash H(KEY, (LEFT XOR BM_0) || (RIGHT XOR BM_1)).
To compute the leaves of the binary hash tree, a so-called L-tree is used.
An L-tree is an unbalanced binary
hash tree, distinct but similar to the main XMSS binary hash tree. The
algorithm ltree (Algorithm 8) takes as input a WOTS+ public key pk and
compresses it to a single n-byte value pk[0]. Towards this end it also takes an
L-tree address ADRS as input that encodes the address of the L-tree, and
the seed SEED.
For the computation of the internal n-byte nodes of a Merkle tree, the
subroutine treeHash (Algorithm 9) accepts an XMSS private key SK (including seed SEED),
an unsigned integer s (the start index), an unsigned integer t (the target node height),
and an address ADRS that encodes the address of the containing tree.
For the height of a node within a tree counting starts with the leaves at height zero.
The treeHash algorithm returns the root node of a tree of height t
with the leftmost leaf being the hash of the WOTS+ pk with index s.
It is REQUIRED that s % 2^t = 0, i.e. that the leaf at index s is a left most
leaf of a sub-tree of height t. Otherwise the hash-addressing scheme fails.
The treeHash algorithm described here uses a stack holding up to (t - 1) nodes, with
the usual stack functions push() and pop(). We furthermore assume that the height of
a node (an unsigned integer) is stored alongside a node's
value (an n-byte string) on the stack.
The XMSS key pair is computed as described in XMSS_keyGen (Algorithm 10).
The XMSS public key PK
consists of the root of the binary hash tree and the seed SEED, both also stored in SK.
The root is computed using treeHash.
For XMSS, there is only a single main tree.
Hence, the used address is set to the all-zero string in the beginning.
Note that we do not define any specific format or handling for the XMSS
private key SK by introducing this algorithm. It relates to
requirements described earlier and simply shows
a basic but very inefficient example to initialize a private key.
The above is just an example algorithm. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to use pseudorandom key generation to reduce the private key size.
Public and private key generation MAY be interleaved to save space. Especially, when
a pseudorandom method is used to generate the private key, generation MAY be done when
the respective WOTS+ key pair is needed by treeHash.
The format of an XMSS public key is given below.
An XMSS signature is a (4 + n + (len + h) * n)-byte string consisting of
the index idx_sig of the used WOTS+ key pair (4 bytes),
a byte string r used for randomized message hashing (n bytes),
a WOTS+ signature sig_ots (len * n bytes),
the so-called authentication path 'auth' for the leaf associated with the used
WOTS+ key pair (h * n bytes).
The authentication path is an array of h n-byte strings. It contains
the siblings of the nodes on the path from the used leaf to the root.
It does not contain the nodes on the path itself. These nodes are
needed by a verifier to compute a root node for the tree from the WOTS+
public key. A node Node is addressed by its position in the tree.
Node(x, y) denotes the y^th node on level x with y = 0 being the leftmost node on a level.
The leaves are on level 0, the root is on level h. An authentication path contains exactly
one node on every layer 0 ≤ x ≤ h - 1.
For the i^th WOTS+ key pair, counting from zero,
the j^th authentication path node is
Node(j, floor(i / (2^j)) XOR 1)
The computation of the authentication path is discussed in .
The data format for a signature is given below.
To compute the XMSS signature of a message M with an XMSS private key,
the signer first computes a randomized message digest using a random
value r, idx_sig, the index of the WOTS+ key pair to be used, and the root value from the public key as key. Then a WOTS+
signature of the message digest is computed using the next unused WOTS+ private key.
Next, the authentication path is computed. Finally, the private key is updated, i.e.
idx is incremented. An implementation MUST NOT output the signature
before the private key is updated.
The node values of the authentication path MAY be computed in any way.
This computation is assumed to be performed by the subroutine buildAuth
for the function XMSS_sign, as below.
The fastest alternative is to store all tree nodes and set the
array in the signature by copying the respective nodes. The least
storage-intensive alternative is to recompute all nodes for each
signature online using the treeHash algorithm (Algorithm 9).
There exist several algorithms in between, with different
time/storage trade-offs. For an overview, see .
A further approach can be found in .
Note that the details of this procedure are not
relevant to interoperability; it is not necessary to know any of these
details in order to perform the signature verification operation. The
following version of buildAuth is given for completeness.
It is a simple example for understanding, but extremely inefficient.
The use of one of the alternative algorithms is strongly RECOMMENDED.
Given an XMSS private key SK, all nodes in a tree are determined.
Their value is defined in terms of treeHash (Algorithm 9).
Hence, one can compute the authentication path as follows:
We split the description of the signature generation into two main algorithms.
The first one, treeSig (Algorithm 11), generates the main part of an XMSS signature and is also used by the multi-tree version
XMSS^MT. XMSS_sign (Algorithm 12) calls treeSig but handles message compression before and the private key update afterwards.
The algorithm treeSig (Algorithm 11) described below calculates the WOTS+ signature on an n-byte message and the
corresponding authentication path.
treeSig takes as inputs an n-byte message M',
an XMSS private key SK, and an address ADRS. It returns the concatenation of the WOTS+ signature sig_ots and
authentication path auth.
The algorithm XMSS_sign (Algorithm 12) described below calculates an
updated private key SK and a signature on a message M. XMSS_sign takes as inputs a message M of arbitrary length, and
an XMSS private key SK. It returns the byte string containing the concatenation of
the updated private key SK and the signature Sig.
An XMSS signature is verified by first computing the message digest
using randomness r, index idx_sig, the root from PK and message M. Then the used WOTS+ public key pk_ots is computed
from the WOTS+ signature using WOTS_pkFromSig. The WOTS+ public key in turn is used to compute the
corresponding leaf using an L-tree. The leaf, together with index idx_sig and
authentication path auth is used to compute an
alternative root value for the tree. The
verification succeeds if and only if the computed root value matches the one in the XMSS public key.
In any other case it MUST return fail.
As for signature generation, we split verification into two parts to allow for reuse in the XMSS^MT description.
The steps also needed for XMSS^MT are done by the function XMSS_rootFromSig (Algorithm 13).
XMSS_verify (Algorithm 14) calls XMSS_rootFromSig as a subroutine and handles the XMSS-specific steps.
The main part of XMSS signature verification is done by the function XMSS_rootFromSig (Algorithm 13) described below.
XMSS_rootFromSig takes as inputs an index idx_sig, a WOTS+ signature sig_ots, an authentication path auth, an n-byte
message M', seed SEED, and address ADRS. XMSS_rootFromSig returns an n-byte string holding
the value of the root of a tree defined by the input data.
The full XMSS signature verification is depicted below (Algorithm 14).
It handles message compression, delegates the root computation to XMSS_rootFromSig,
and compares the result to the value in the public key.
XMSS_verify takes an XMSS signature Sig, a message M, and an XMSS public key PK.
XMSS_verify returns true if and only if Sig is a valid signature on M under
public key PK. Otherwise, it returns false.
An implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to
generate the XMSS private key from a single n-byte value. For example, the method
suggested in and explained below MAY be used. Other methods,
such as the one in , MAY be used. The choice of a
pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the
cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used XMSS parameters.
For XMSS a similar method than the one used for WOTS+ can be used.
The suggested method from can be described using PRF.
During key generation a uniformly random n-byte string S is sampled
from a secure source of randomness. This seed S MUST NOT be confused with the public seed SEED.
The seed S MUST be independent of SEED and as it is the main secret, it MUST be kept secret.
This seed S is used to generate an n-byte value S_ots for each WOTS+ key pair.
The n-byte value S_ots can then be used to compute the
respective WOTS+ private key using the method described in .
The seeds for the WOTS+ key pairs are computed as S_ots[i] = PRF(S, toByte(i, 32)) where i is the index of the WOTS+ key pair.
An advantage of this method is that a WOTS+ key can be computed using only len + 1 evaluations of PRF when S is given.
Some applications might require to work with partial private keys or copies of private keys.
Examples include delegation of signing rights / proxy signatures, and load balancing.
Such applications MAY use their own key format and MAY use a signing algorithm different from the
one described above. The index in partial private keys or copies of a private key MAY be manipulated
as required by the applications. However, applications MUST establish means that guarantee that
each index and thereby each WOTS+ key pair is used to sign only a single message.
XMSS^MT is a method for signing a large but fixed number of messages. It was first described in . It builds on XMSS.
XMSS^MT uses a tree of several layers of XMSS trees, a so-called hypertree. The trees on
top and intermediate layers are used to sign the root nodes of the
trees on the respective layer below. Trees on the lowest layer are used to sign the actual
messages. All XMSS trees have equal height.
Consider an XMSS^MT tree of total height h that has d layers of XMSS trees of height h / d. Then layer d - 1 contains
one XMSS tree, layer d - 2 contains 2^(h / d) XMSS trees, and so on. Finally, layer 0 contains 2^(h - h / d) XMSS trees.
In addition to all XMSS parameters, an XMSS^MT system requires
the number of tree layers d, specified as an integer value that divides h without remainder. The same
tree height h / d and the same Winternitz parameter w are used for all
tree layers.
All the trees on higher layers sign root nodes of other trees which are n-byte strings. Hence, no message
compression is needed and WOTS+ is used to sign the root nodes themselves instead of their hash values.
An XMSS^MT private key SK_MT (S for secret) consists of one reduced XMSS private key for each XMSS tree. These reduced XMSS
private keys just contain the WOTS+ private keys corresponding to that XMSS key pair and no pseudorandom function key, no index, no public seed, no root node.
Instead, SK_MT contains a single n-byte pseudorandom function key SK_PRF, a single (ceil(h / 8))-byte index idx_MT, a single n-byte seed SEED, and a single root value root
which is the root of the single tree on the top layer.
The index is a global index over all WOTS+ key pairs of all XMSS trees on layer 0. It is initialized with 0. It stores the index of the last used WOTS+ key pair on the bottom
layer, i.e. a number between 0 and 2^h - 1.
The reduced XMSS private keys MUST either be generated as described in
or using a cryptographic pseudorandom method as discussed in .
As for XMSS, the PRF key SK_PRF
MUST be sampled from a secure source of randomness that follows the uniform distribution.
SEED is generated as a uniformly random n-byte string. Although SEED is public, it is critical for
security that it is
generated using a good entropy source. The root is the root node of the single XMSS tree on the top layer. Its computation is explained below.
As for XMSS, root and SEED are public information and would classically be considered part of the public key. However, as both are needed for
signing, which only takes the private key, they are also part of SK_MT.
This document does not define any specific format for the XMSS^MT
private key SK_MT as it is not required for interoperability.
The algorithm descriptions below use a function getXMSS_SK(SK, x, y) that outputs the reduced private key of
the x^th XMSS tree on the y^th layer.
The XMSS^MT public key PK_MT contains the root of the single XMSS tree on layer d - 1 and the seed SEED. These are the same values as in the private key SK_MT.
The pseudorandom function PRF keyed with SEED is used to generate the bitmasks and keys for all XMSS trees.
XMSSMT_keyGen (Algorithm 15) shows example pseudocode to generate SK_MT and PK_MT. The n-byte root node of the top layer tree is computed using
treeHash. The algorithm XMSSMT_keyGen outputs an XMSS^MT private key SK_MT and an XMSS^MT public key PK_MT.
The algorithm below gives an example of how the reduced XMSS private keys can be generated. However, any of the above mentioned ways is acceptable as long
as the cryptographic strength of the used method matches or superseeds that of the used XMSS^MT parameter set.
The above is just an example algorithm. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to use pseudorandom key generation to reduce the private key size.
Public and private key generation MAY be interleaved to save space. Especially, when
a pseudorandom method is used to generate the private key, generation MAY be delayed to the point when
the respective WOTS+ key pair is needed by another algorithm.
The format of an XMSS^MT public key is given below.
An XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT is a byte string of length (ceil(h / 8) + n + (h + d * len) * n).
It consists of
the index idx_sig of the used WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer (ceil(h / 8) bytes),
a byte string r used for randomized message hashing (n bytes),
d reduced XMSS signatures ((h / d + len) * n bytes each).
The reduced XMSS signatures only contain a WOTS+ signature sig_ots and an authentication path auth.
They contain no index idx and no byte string r.
The data format for a signature is given below.
To compute the XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT of a message M using an XMSS^MT private
key SK_MT, XMSSMT_sign (Algorithm 16) described below uses treeSig as defined in .
First, the signature index is set to idx_sig. Next, PRF is used to compute a pseudorandom n-byte string r.
This n-byte string, idx_sig, and the root node from PK_MT are then used to compute a randomized message digest of length n.
The message digest is signed using the WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer with absolute index idx.
The authentication path for the WOTS+ key pair is computed as well as the root of the containing XMSS tree.
The root is signed by the parent XMSS tree. This is repeated until the top tree is reached.
Algorithm 16 is only one method to compute XMSS^MT signatures. Especially, there exist time-memory trade-offs that
allow to reduce the signing time to less than the signing time of an XMSS scheme with tree height h / d. These trade-offs
prevent certain values from being recomputed several times by keeping a state and
distribute all computations over all signature generations. Details can be found in .
XMSS^MT signature verification (Algorithm 17) can be summarized as
d XMSS signature verifications with small changes. First, the message is hashed.
The XMSS signatures are then all on n-byte values. Second,
instead of comparing the computed root node to a given value, a signature on this root node is verified.
Only the root node of the top tree is compared to the value in the XMSS^MT public key.
XMSSMT_verify uses XMSS_rootFromSig. The function getXMSSSignature(Sig_MT, i)
returns the ith reduced XMSS signature from the XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT. XMSSMT_verify takes as
inputs an XMSS^MT signature Sig_MT, a message M and a public key PK_MT. XMSSMT_verify returns true
if and only if Sig_MT is a valid signature on M under public key PK_MT. Otherwise, it
returns false.
Like for XMSS, an implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to
generate the XMSS^MT private key from a single n-byte value. For example, the method
explained below MAY be used. Other methods, such as the one in ,
MAY be used. The choice of a
pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the
cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used XMSS^MT parameters.
For XMSS^MT a method similar to that for XMSS and WOTS+ can be used. The method uses
PRF. During key generation
a uniformly random n-byte string S_MT is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This seed S_MT is used
to generate one n-byte value S for each XMSS key pair. This n-byte value can be used to compute the
respective XMSS private key using the method described in .
Let S[x][y] be the seed for the x^th XMSS private key on layer y. The seeds are computed as S[x][y] = PRF(PRF(S, toByte(y, 32)), toByte(x, 32)).
The content of also applies to XMSS^MT.
This section provides a basic set of parameter sets which are assumed to cover most relevant applications.
Parameter sets for two classical security levels are defined. Parameters with n = 32 provide a classical
security level of 256 bits. Parameters with n = 64 provide a classical
security level of 512 bits.
Considering quantum-computer-aided attacks, these output sizes yield post-quantum
security of 128 and 256 bits, respectively.
For the n = 32 and n = 64 settings, we give parameters that use
SHA2-256, SHA2-512 as defined in , and the SHA3/Keccak-based extendable output functions SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256 as defined in .
The parameter sets using SHA2-256 are mandatory for deployment and therefore
MUST be provided by any implementation. The remaining
parameter sets specified in this document are OPTIONAL.
SHA2 does not provide a keyed-mode itself.
To implement the keyed hash functions the following is used for SHA2 with n = 32:
F: SHA2-256(toByte(0, 32) || KEY || M),H: SHA2-256(toByte(1, 32) || KEY || M),H_msg: SHA2-256(toByte(2, 32) || KEY || M),PRF: SHA2-256(toByte(3, 32) || KEY || M).
Accordingly, for SHA2 with n = 64 we use:
F: SHA2-512(toByte(0, 64) || KEY || M),H: SHA2-512(toByte(1, 64) || KEY || M),H_msg: SHA2-512(toByte(2, 64) || KEY || M),PRF: SHA2-512(toByte(3, 64) || KEY || M).
The n-byte padding is used for two reasons. First, it is necessary that the
internal compression function takes 2n-byte blocks but keys are n and 3n bytes long.
Second, the padding is used to achieve independence of the different function families.
Finally, for the PRF no full-fledged HMAC is needed as the message length is fixed,
meaning that standard length extension attacks are not a concern here. For that
reason, the simpler construction above suffices.
Similar constructions are used with SHA3.
To implement the keyed hash functions the following is used for SHA3 with n = 32:
F: SHAKE128(toByte(0, 32) || KEY || M, 256),H: SHAKE128(toByte(1, 32) || KEY || M, 256),H_msg: SHAKE128(toByte(2, 32) || KEY || M, 256),PRF: SHAKE128(toByte(3, 32) || KEY || M, 256).
Accordingly, for SHA3 with n = 64 we use:
F: SHAKE256(toByte(0, 64) || KEY || M, 512),H: SHAKE256(toByte(1, 64) || KEY || M, 512),H_msg: SHAKE256(toByte(2, 64) || KEY || M, 512),PRF: SHAKE256(toByte(3, 64) || KEY || M, 512).
As for SHA2, an initial n-byte identifier is used to achieve independence
of the different function families.
While a shorter identifier could be used in case of SHA3, we use n bytes for consistency with the SHA2 implementations.
To fully describe a WOTS+ signature method, the parameters n, and w,
as well as the functions F and PRF MUST be specified. This section defines
several WOTS+ signature systems, each of which is identified by a name.
Values for len are provided for convenience.
NameF / PRFnwlenREQUIRED:WOTSP_SHA2-256_W16SHA2-256321667OPTIONAL:WOTSP_SHA2-512_W16SHA2-5126416131WOTSP_SHAKE128_W16SHAKE128321667WOTSP_SHAKE256_W16SHAKE2566416131
The implementation of the single functions is done as described above.
XDR formats for WOTS+ are listed in .
To fully describe an XMSS signature method, the parameters n, w, and h,
as well as the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF MUST be specified. This section defines
different XMSS signature systems, each of which is identified by a name.
We define parameter sets that implement the functions using
SHA2 and SHA3 for n = 32 and n = 64 as described above.
NameFunctionsnwlenhREQUIRED:XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10SHA2-25632166710XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16SHA2-25632166716XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20SHA2-25632166720OPTIONAL:XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H10SHA2-512641613110XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H16SHA2-512641613116XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H20SHA2-512641613120XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H10SHAKE12832166710XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H16SHAKE12832166716XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H20SHAKE12832166720XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H10SHAKE256641613110XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H16SHAKE256641613116XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H20SHAKE256641613120
The XDR formats for XMSS are listed in .
To fully describe an XMSS^MT signature method, the parameters n, w, h, and d,
as well as the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF MUST be specified. This section defines
several XMSS^MT signature systems, each of which is identified by a name.
We define parameter sets that implement the functions using
SHA2 and SHA3 for n = 32 and n = 64 as described above.
NameFunctionsnwlenhdREQUIRED:XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D2SHA2-256321667202XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D4SHA2-256321667204XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D2SHA2-256321667402XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D4SHA2-256321667404XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D8SHA2-256321667408XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D3SHA2-256321667603XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D6SHA2-256321667606XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D12SHA2-2563216676012OPTIONAL:XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D2SHA2-5126416131202XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D4SHA2-5126416131204XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D2SHA2-5126416131402XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D4SHA2-5126416131404XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D8SHA2-5126416131408XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D3SHA2-5126416131603XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D6SHA2-5126416131606XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D12SHA2-51264161316012XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D2SHAKE128321667202XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D4SHAKE128321667204XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D2SHAKE128321667402XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D4SHAKE128321667404XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D8SHAKE128321667408XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D3SHAKE128321667603XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D6SHAKE128321667606XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D12SHAKE1283216676012XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D2SHAKE2566416131202XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D4SHAKE2566416131204XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D2SHAKE2566416131402XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D4SHAKE2566416131404XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D8SHAKE2566416131408XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D3SHAKE2566416131603XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D6SHAKE2566416131606XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D12SHAKE25664161316012
XDR formats for XMSS^MT are listed in .
The goal of this note is to describe the WOTS+, XMSS and XMSS^MT algorithms
following the scientific literature. The description is done in a modular way
that allows to base a description of stateless hash-based signature algorithms like
SPHINCS on it.
This note slightly deviates from the scientific literature using a tweak that prevents
multi-user / multi-target attacks against H_msg. To this end, the public key as well as
the index of the used one-time key pair become part of the hash function key. Thereby
we achieve a domain separation that forces an attacker to decide which hash value to attack.
For the generation of the randomness used for randomized message hashing, we apply a PRF,
keyed with a secret value, to the index of the used one-time key pair instead of the message.
The reason is that this requires to process the message only once instead of twice. For
long messages this improves speed and simplifies implementations on resource constrained devices
that cannot hold the entire message in storage.
We give one mandatory set of parameters using SHA2-256. The reasons are twofold. On the one hand,
SHA2-256 is part of most cryptographic libraries.
On the other hand, a 256-bit hash function leads to parameters that provide 128 bit of security even
against quantum-computer-aided attacks. A post-quantum security level of 256 bit seems overly
conservative. However, to prepare for possible cryptanalytic breakthroughs, we also provide
OPTIONAL parameter sets using the less widely supported SHA2-512, SHAKE-256, and SHAKE-512 functions.
We suggest the value w = 16 for the Winternitz parameter.
No bigger values are included since the decrease in signature size then becomes less significant.
Furthermore, the value w = 16 considerably simplifies the implementations
of some of the algorithms. Please note that we do allow w = 4, but
limit the specified parameter sets to w = 16 for efficiency reasons.
The signature and public key formats are designed so that they are
easy to parse. Each format starts with a 32-bit enumeration value
that indicates all of the details of the signature algorithm and
hence defines all of the information that is needed in order to parse the
format.
The enumeration values used in this note are palindromes, which have
the same byte representation in either host order or network order.
This fact allows an implementation to omit the conversion between
byte order for those enumerations. Note however that the idx field
used in XMSS and XMSS^MT signatures and private keys MUST be properly
converted to and from network byte order; this is the only field
that requires such conversion. There are 2^32 XDR enumeration
values, 2^16 of which are palindromes, which is adequate for
the foreseeable future. If there is a need for further assignments,
non-palindromes can be assigned.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to create
three registries: one for WOTS+ signatures as defined in
, one for XMSS signatures and one for XMSS^MT
signatures; the latter two being defined in . For the
sake of clarity and convenience, the first sets of WOTS+, XMSS, and XMSS^MT
parameter sets are defined in . Additions to these
registries require that a specification be documented in an RFC or another
permanent and readily available reference in sufficient detail to make
interoperability between independent implementations possible.
Each entry in the registry contains the following elements:
a short name, such as "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20", a positive number, anda reference to a specification that completely defines the
signature method test cases that can be used to verify the
correctness of an implementation.
Requests to add an entry to the registry MUST include the name and the
reference. The number is assigned by IANA. These number assignments
SHOULD use the smallest available palindromic number. Submitters
SHOULD have their requests reviewed by the IRTF Crypto Forum Research
Group (CFRG) at cfrg@ietf.org. Interested applicants that are
unfamiliar with IANA processes should visit http://www.iana.org.
The numbers between 0xDDDDDDDD (decimal 3,722,304,989) and
0xFFFFFFFF (decimal 4,294,967,295) inclusive, will not be
assigned by IANA, and are reserved for private use; no attempt
will be made to prevent multiple sites from using the same
value in different (and incompatible) ways
.
The WOTS+ registry is as follows.
NameReferenceNumeric Identifier WOTSP_SHA2-256_W16 0x01000001 WOTSP_SHA2-512_W16 0x02000002 WOTSP_SHAKE128_W16 0x03000003 WOTSP_SHAKE256_W16 0x04000004
The XMSS registry is as follows.
NameReferenceNumeric Identifier XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10 0x01000001 XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16 0x02000002 XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20 0x03000003 XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H10 0x04000004 XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H16 0x05000005 XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H20 0x06000006 XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H10 0x07000007 XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H16 0x08000008 XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H20 0x09000009 XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H10 0x0a00000a XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H16 0x0b00000b XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H20 0x0c00000c
The XMSS^MT registry is as follows.
NameReferenceNumeric IdentifierXMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D20x01000001XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D40x02000002XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D20x03000003XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D40x04000004XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D80x05000005XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D30x06000006XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D60x07000007XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D120x08000008XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D20x09000009XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D40x0a00000aXMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D20x0b00000bXMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D40x0c00000cXMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D80x0d00000dXMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D30x0e00000eXMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D60x0f00000fXMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D120x01010101XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D20x02010102XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D40x03010103XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D20x04010104XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D40x05010105XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D80x06010106XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D30x07010107XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D60x08010108XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D120x09010109XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D20x0a01010aXMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D40x0b01010bXMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D20x0c01010cXMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D40x0d01010dXMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D80x0e01010eXMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D30x0f01010fXMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D60x01020201XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D120x02020202
An IANA registration of a signature system does not constitute an
endorsement of that system or its security.
A signature system is considered secure if it prevents an attacker
from forging a valid signature. More specifically, consider a setting
in which an attacker gets a public key and can learn signatures
on arbitrary messages of his choice. A signature system is secure if,
even in this setting, the attacker can not produce a new message, signature
pair of his choosing such that the verification algorithm accepts.
Preventing an attacker from mounting an attack means that the attack is computationally
too expensive to be carried out. There exist various estimates for when
a computation is too expensive to be done. For that reason, this note only
describes how expensive it is for an attacker to generate a forgery.
Parameters are accompanied by a bit security value. The meaning of bit security is as follows.
A parameter set grants b bits of security if the best attack takes at least 2^(b - 1)
bit operations to achieve a success probability of 1/2. Hence, to mount a successful attack,
an attacker needs to perform 2^b bit operations on average. The given values for bit security
were estimated according to .
A full security proof for all schemes described in this document can be found in . This proof
shows that an attacker has to break at least one out of certain security properties
of the used hash functions and PRFs to forge a signature in any of the described schemes. The proof in considers
a different initial message compression than the randomized hashing used here. We comment on this below.
For the original schemes, these proofs show that
an attacker has to break certain minimal security properties. In particular, it is not
sufficient to break the collision resistance of the hash functions to generate a forgery.
More specifically, the requirements on the used functions are that
F and H are post-quantum multi-function multi-target second-preimage resistant keyed functions,
F fulfills an additional statistical requirement that roughly says that most images have at least two preimages,
PRF is a post-quantum pseudorandom function,
H_msg is a post-quantum multi-target extended target collision resistant keyed hash function.
For detailed definitions of these properties see . To give some intuition: Multi-function multi-target second preimage resistance is
an extension of second preimage resistance to keyed hash functions, covering the case where an adversary succeeds if it finds a second preimage for
one out of many values. The same holds for multi-target extended target collision resistance
which just lacks the multi-function identifier as target collision resistance already considers keyed hash functions.
The proof in splits PRF into two functions. When PRF is used for pseudorandom key generation or generation of randomness
for randomized message hashing it is still considered a pseudorandom function. Whenever PRF is used to
generate bitmasks and hash function keys it is modeled as a random oracle. This is due to technical reasons in the proof and an implementation
using a pseudorandom function is secure.
The proof in considers classical randomized hashing for the initial message compression, i.e., H(r, M) instead of H(r || getRoot(PK) || index, M).
This classical randomized hashing allows to get a security reduction from extended target collision resistance , a property that is
conjectured to be strictly weaker than collision resistance. However, it turns out that in this case, an attacker could still launch a multi-target attack even against multiple users at the same time.
The reason is that the adversary attacking u users at the same time learns u * 2^h randomized hashes H(r_i_j || M_i_j) with signature index i in [0, 2^h - 1] and user index j in [0, u].
It suffices to find a single pair (r*, M*) such that H(r* || M*) = H(r_i_u || M_i_u) for one out of the u * 2^h learned hashes. Hence, an attacker can do a brute force search in time 2^n / u * 2^h instead of 2^n.
The indexed randomized hashing H(r || getRoot(PK) || toByte(idx, n), M)
used in this work makes the hash function calls position- and
user-dependent. This thwarts the above attack because each hash
function evaluation during an attack can only target one of the learned
randomized hash values. More specifically, an attacker now has to
decide which index idx and which root value to use for each query.
If one assumes that the used hash function is a random function it can be shown that
a multi user existential forgery attack that targets this message compression has a complexity
of 2^n hash function calls.
The given bit security values were estimated based on the complexity of the best known generic attacks against
the required security properties of the used hash and pseudorandom functions assuming conventional and quantum adversaries.
At the time of writing, generic attacks are the best known attacks for the parameters suggested in the classical setting. Also
in the quantum setting there are no dedicated attacks known that perform better than generic attacks. Nevertheless,
the topic of quantum cryptanalysis of hash functions is not as well understood as in the classical setting.
The security assumptions made to argue for the security of the described schemes are minimal. Any signature algorithm
that allows arbitrary size messages relies on the security of a cryptographic hash function, either on collision resistance
or on extended target collision resistance if randomized hashing is used for message compression.
For the schemes described here this is already sufficient to be secure. In contrast, common signature schemes like RSA, DSA, and ECDSA additionally rely on
the conjectured hardness of certain mathematical problems.
A post-quantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against attackers with
access to a reasonably sized quantum computer. At the time of writing this note,
whether or not it is feasible to build such a machine is an open conjecture. However, significant progress was
made over the last few years in this regard. Hence, we consider it a matter of risk assessment to prepare for this case.
In contrast to RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, the described signature systems are post-quantum-secure if they
are used with an appropriate cryptographic hash function. In particular, for post-quantum security,
the size of n must be twice the size required for classical security. This is in order to
protect against quantum square root attacks due to Grover's algorithm. It has been shown in that
variants of Grover's algorithm are the optimal generic attacks against the security properties of hash functions required
for the described scheme.
As stated above, we only consider generic attacks here, as cryptographic hash functions should be deprecated as soon as there
exist dedicated attacks that perform significantly better. This also applies for the quantum setting. As soon as there exist
dedicated quantum attacks against the used hash function that perform significantly better than the described generic attacks
these hash functions should not be used anymore for the described schemes or the computation of the security level has to be redone.
We would like to thank Johannes Braun, Peter Campbell, Scott Fluhrer, Burt
Kaliski, Adam Langley, David McGrew, Rafael Misoczki, Sean Parkinson, Joost
Rijneveld, Sebastian Roland, and the Keccak team for their help and comments.
&rfc2119;
&rfc5226;
&rfc4506;
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
National Institute of Standards and Technology
SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Hash-based Digital Signature Schemes
Panel: Shoring up the Infrastructure: A Strategy for Standardizing Hash Signatures
Hash-Based Signatures
This note describes a digital signature system based on cryptographic
hash functions, following the seminal work in this area of Lamport,
Diffie, Winternitz, and Merkle, as adapted by Leighton and Micali in
1995. It specifies a one-time signature scheme and a general
signature scheme. These systems provide asymmetric authentication
without using large integer mathematics and can achieve a high
security level. They are suitable for compact implementations, are
relatively simple to implement, and naturally resist side-channel
attacks. Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures
would still be secure even if it proves feasible for an attacker to
build a quantum computer.
Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems
XMSS - A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal
Security Assumptions
Optimal Parameters for XMSS^MT
W-OTS+ - Shorter Signatures for Hash-Based Signature Schemes
Practical Forward Secure Signatures using Minimal Security AssumptionsSPHINCS: Practical Stateless Hash-Based Signatures
Mitigating Multi-Target Attacks in Hash-based Signatures
A space- and time-efficient Implementation of the Merkle Tree Traversal Algorithm
The WOTS+ signature and public key formats are formally defined
using XDR in order to provide an
unambiguous, machine readable definition.
Though XDR is used, these formats are simple and easy to
parse without any special tools. To avoid the need to convert
to and from network / host byte order, the enumeration values are all
palindromes. Note that this representation includes all optional parameter
sets. The same applies for the XMSS and XMSS^MT formats below.